Introduction
Development is a long-term process and involves both quantitative and qualitative changes. In the now-developed countries, this took the form of phased transformation from predominantly agrarian to industrial and then knowledge-based economies. Whether contemporary developing countries have to go through the same process is a debatable question. What is not debatable, however, is the need for policy in these countries to address the issue of technological progress underlying the process of transformation.
Technological progress stems from the build-up of innovative activities; innovation itself is the product of a complex set of interactions conditioned by institutional, organizational and cultural systems. Restrictive systems limit the scope for innovation and technological progress. Dynamic systems, on the other hand, create opportunities for innovation and technological progress and hence for long-term growth and development. Why then are some countries or societies more inclined to innovation than others? In particular, why is the incidence of innovation low in developing countries?
There is nothing in the nature of developing countries that makes them less prone to or inherently incapable of innovation. The propensity to innovate is essentially a function of factors relating to the roles of the state and the market, and particularly the extent to which policy is disposed to take the lead in enabling individual and corporate market 'players' to seize emerging opportunities through the provision of appropriate institutional mechanisms. The nature of these mechanisms varies from country to country. In many developing countries, technology policy has taken the form of a 'topdown' linear structure, very much in line with the traditional practice of planning from the centre. There is now growing awareness that prospects for innovation and technological progress are least enhanced by a top-down approach to technology policy, and that the cause for sustainable development would rather be best served through the adoption of what has recently come to be known as national innovation systems (NISs) as a policy framework. This, however, poses a challenge for policy as it involves a multitude of agents of production and consumption engaged in a complex network of interactions. For most developing countries, characterized by institutional and organizational fragmentation, the task of setting the NIS in place calls for 'capacitybuilding' initiatives as a priority policy concern. Not much has been achieved yet in this respect, however, so that the potential benefits of technology globalization are likely to be unevenly distributed across the spectrum of countries. Thus, the newly industrializing countries are, by virtue of their economic status, more favourably placed than the lowincome developing countries to address the issue of innovation through the institution of the NIS.
Policy in developing countries is also under the pressure of having to respond to the challenges of the global intellectual property rights regime enacted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and brought forth by the rapid pace of globalization. Globalization has not produced a level playing field for 'players' in the innovation field in both developed and developing countries. Empirical evidence on R&D location shows that firms still prefer to establish strategic innovation activities in their home countries, despite globalization of investment in innovative activities.
1 Cross-border R&D, however small, is taking place largely among the advanced countries, while newly industrializing countries (NICs) are also seeking to increase their respective shares of global R&D.
. This paper seeks to examine the various instruments and institutional arrangements that successful, newly industrializing countries have adopted to encourage local technology development and attract cross-border innovation investments. The paper is organized in five sections. The second section, following this introduction, analyses sources and trends of technology across the world. The third section addresses the changing role of national innovation systems in the context of the renewed debate on the role of the state under the pressure of globalization. The fourth section maps out the technology development experience of the newly industrializing countries and draws lessons for developing countries in general. The fifth section analyses the role of public innovation policies both in developed and developing countries in the light of the changing context forced on international institutions by the globalization trend.
Concluding remarks are given in the sixth section.
Globalization of technology
In terms of principle, globalization of technology is technology diffusion by another name. There are three strands of economic theory that explain long-run economic growth and directly address the question how knowledge diffusion takes place. First, although neoclassical growth theory seeks to assign a central role to knowledge as a factor explaining long-run growth, it considers knowledge as exogenously determined and therefore focuses solely on the public good aspect of technology (Solow 1956 (Solow , 1957 .
Diffusion is assumed to be automatic and costless. However, the prediction and claim of the neoclassical theory of growth is that in the long-run, income across economies will converge as a result of the free interplay of market forces. Neoclassical theory is particularly conspicuous for its reticence regarding the dynamic process of innovation, which is far from smooth, automatic and even predictable for its outcomes.
Second, the 'technology gap' theory of long-run economic growth emphasizes the advantages of technological backwardness and the scope for catching up by the developing countries (Fagerberg 1987; Gerschenkron 1962) . The mechanism of knowledge diffusion in this case involves the mastery of developed-country technologies by developing countries. Abramovitz (1979) argued that the existence of domestic capability is a precondition to assimilate spillovers from activities originating elsewhere.
The process of imitation of technology from advanced countries entails cost and this cost varies positively with the increase in the complexity of knowledge. Thus, without a sufficient level of domestic capabilities, which requires massive investment, a country is unlikely to benefit from the technological knowledge conveyed through a variety of technology transfer mechanisms. Such a country is consequently doomed to lag behind, far from forging ahead and catching up on the technology leaders (Verspagen 1991) .
Third, the new growth theory, also known as 'endogenous growth theory', stresses the role of innovative investment, human capital accumulation and externalities as the dominant factors that determine long-run economic growth. The theory acknowledges that although it is factor accumulation that accounts for growth, for factor accumulation to grow, the returns to capital stock should not diminish. The new knowledge, which prevents diminishing returns on capital stock, is produced by investment in research and development. Moreover, the increase in knowledge will not be appropriated solely by those who undertake the investment. This implies that the investment effort gives rise to appropriable and non-appropriable knowledge categories.
The latter is alternatively referred to as externalities or knowledge spillovers (Aghion and Howitt 1992; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Romer 1986 ). Central to the new growth theory is the role of investment in innovation projects. While latecomers in the development process may, in theory, have the advantage of not having to 'reinvent the wheel', in practice, their access to the spillover benefits is likely to be constrained as technological knowledge becomes increasingly complex and tacit in the face of the fast pace of globalization (Fagerberg and Verspagen 2002) .
The new growth theory invigorated interest in the empirical study of the interdependence between economic growth and the international diffusion of technology across countries. International trade has been identified as the single most important channel for the diffusion of technological knowledge across countries (Coe and Helpman 1995; Coe et al. 1997; Evenson and Singh 1997) . Over time, the composition of trade has undergone substantial changes with the weight of science-based high-technology products, largely originating from developed countries, constantly increasing. The United
States accounts for more than one-fifth of the science-based manufactured exports of the global economy. Other important countries, which produce and export science-based manufactured products, are Japan (10.7 per cent), Germany (8.7 per cent), the United Kingdom (7.2 per cent), France (6.2 per cent), the Netherlands (5.6 per cent), Canada (3.2 per cent), Italy (1.9 per cent), and Sweden and Switzerland (1.4 per cent each). However, the developing economies only accounted for 11.7 per cent of the global science-based manufactured exports (Table 1) .
Multinational corporations predominantly control international trade in the global market. Moreover, a substantial proportion of international trade is either inter-industry or intra-industry trade (Jones 2001; Kumar and Siddharthan 1997) , which means that a good part, if not all, of the science-based exports originating from the developing economies derives from the operation of multinational corporations operating in these economies. This concentration of the source of science-based manufactured commodities traded in the global market has reduced the importance of international trade as a true carrier of international diffusion of technology. Table 1 Distribution of sources of technology across countries and regions Note: * implies figure belongs to the year 1997
Both output and input indicators of innovation, presented in Table 1, 
National innovation systems (NISs) and the role of the state
Knowledge accumulation is very much rooted in the evolution of human civilization.
Governments have pursued science and technology policies to improve the innovative performances of agents of production (Mowery 1995) . They have also created a network of institutions to promote interactions between agents of production and enhance their competitiveness in the international market. The accumulation of knowledge and provision of the infrastructure to enhance the generation of knowledge and the implementation of technology policy have been brought together in the formulation of the concept of national innovation systems (NISs). The NIS is a new approach for the study of innovation (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1988 Lundvall , 1992 McKelvey 1991; Nelson 1993) . (2000); Patel and Pavitt (2000) Significantly, business-funded R&D expenditure has emerged as the most important and widely accepted indicator of innovation in recent years. Table 3 shows the increasing importance of the business-funded innovative activities. Countries vary in terms of experience with respect to private sector expenditure on R&D; but in most countries, business-funded R&D has received substantial government support through incentives and tax concessions (Ruttan 2001) . The nature of state intervention has, however, undergone a substantial transformation from direct participation to indirect participation via supporting commercially-oriented research through public-private participation and also through the provision of subsidies and tax incentives.
The experience of East Asia and lessons for less-developed countries
East Asian economies sustained high rates of economic growth and transformation since There are two distinctly discernible patterns of technological development, which can be observed from a careful analysis of the national innovation systems of the East Asian countries. First, the technological achievements in terms of high-tech exports and sustained high rates of economic growth have been dependent on foreign direct investment (FDI). The countries which followed this path of technological development are Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. However, as is apparent from both the input and output indicators of technological performance shown in Table 4 , industrial enterprises in these countries have weak technological and competitive capability. This is because the national innovation systems in these countries have remained weak in the face of foreign capital that continued to play a dominant role in the supply of technology.
The second pattern emerging from the experience of East Asian countries relates to the path of technological development based on the national innovation system with little or no reliance on foreign direct investment, as in the case of Taiwan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Both these countries used the opportunity of importsubstitution and export-promotion strategies and domestic innovative investment efforts to build technological capability at an enterprise level. These countries moved successfully on the technological ladder through an interactive approach to learning.
First, they created high-quality educational institutions to train the manpower required for new opportunities in the industrial sector. In particular, they put strong emphasis on science-and engineering-based higher educational institutions. This provided the creative, imitative and adaptive learning capabilities for the reverse engineering of products and processes developed by the advanced industrialized countries. Governments in both Taiwan and South Korea created a web of science-and technology-based institutions that helped them understand the complex process of technological innovations. They also took the lead in facilitating access to required technologies and in providing the incentives that private enterprises would need to underwrite the risk of innovation (Suh 2000; Kim 2000) .
Thus, the proactive role of the state in terms of exposing enterprises to the competitive global environment helped to transform enterprises from being imitators to being innovators in a short span of time. In addition, the governments in Taiwan and Korea used a weak intellectual property rights regime to allow enterprises to absorb the technological knowledge derived from the developed countries, using reverse engineering ators of technological knowledge. Protection of intellectual property rights remained quite weak despite legislation aimed at appeasing the international community, particularly the US government (Kumar 2003; Wade 1990 ).
Success in technological experience which saw Taiwan and Korea evolve from For reasons of externalities associated with innovation, there is divergence between the social and private returns from investment in innovative activities, the former being higher than the latter. This is the principal reason for the reluctance of private sector agents to engage in innovative activities (Arrow 1962; Stiglitz 1999; Mani 1999 Thus, a major role of the state in developing countries is to provide a policy framework that will enable domestic agents of production to capture the spillover benefits created by the globalization of capital and technology.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the significance of innovation policies in developing countries for strengthening the national innovation systems and enabling domestic agents of production to achieve technological development and competitiveness in the global market. Developing countries, however, seem to ignore the importance of national innovation systems, preferring instead to adhere to the intellectual property rights regime put in place by the WTO. There are two possible reasons for this. First, developing countries appear to perceive, if naïvely, that because technological globalization has become pervasive, domestic agents of production will have no problem in drawing on the global pool of knowledge. The focus is thus on liberalization policies, the global knowledge market and its accessibility to developing countries. But this position assumed by developing countries smacks of the naïve neoclassical view that innovation is an automatic and costless process. Nothing, however, can be further from the truth.
Moreover, the WTO's strict IPR regime is generally criticized for being disposed in favour of the interests of enterprises in developed countries and against innovation and capability development initiatives in developing countries. 
